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Voting games with abstention: linking completeness and weightedness

Autor
Freixas, J.; Tchantcho, B.; Tedjeugang, N.
Tipus d'activitat
Article en revista
Revista
Decision support systems
Data de publicació
2014-01
Volum
57
Pàgina inicial
172
Pàgina final
177
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2013.08.015 Obrir en finestra nova
Repositori
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/24929 Obrir en finestra nova
Resum
Weighted games for several levels of approval in input and output were introduced in [9]. An extension of the desirability relation for simple games, called the influence relation, was introduced for games with several levels of approval in input in [24] (see also [18]). However, there are weighted games not being complete for the influence relation, something different to what occurs for simple games. In this paper we introduce several extensions of the desirability relation for simple games an...
Citació
Freixas, J.; Tchantcho, B.; Tedjeugang, N. Voting games with abstention: linking completeness and weightedness. "Decision support systems", Gener 2014, vol. 57, p. 172-177.
Paraules clau
Approval, Decision making process, Desirability relations, Input, Multiple levels of approval, Output, Power, Representation, Systems, Voting systems in democratic organizations, Weightedness and completeness
Grup de recerca
GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs

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