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Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index

Autor
Freixas, J.; Lucchetti, R.
Tipus d'activitat
Article en revista
Revista
Annals of operations research
Data de publicació
2016-09-01
Volum
244
Número
2
Pàgina inicial
455
Pàgina final
474
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-016-2124-5 Obrir en finestra nova
Repositori
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/84162 Obrir en finestra nova
Resum
In order to study voting situations when voters can also abstain and the output is binary, i.e., either approval or rejection, a new extended model of voting rule was defined. Accordingly, indices of power, in particular Banzhaf’s index, were considered. In this paper we argue that in this context a power index should be a pair of real numbers, since this better highlights the power of a voter in two different cases, i.e., her being crucial when switching from being in favor to abstain, and fr...
Citació
Freixas, J., Lucchetti, R. Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index. "Annals of operations research", 09 Febrer 2016, p. 1-20.
Paraules clau
Decision Making Process, Voting Systems In Democratic Organizations, Abstention, Power, Axioms
Grup de recerca
GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs

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