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On the stability of generalized second price auctions with budgets

Autor
Diaz, J.; Giotis, I.; Kirousis, L.; Markakis, E.; Serna, M.
Tipus d'activitat
Article en revista
Revista
Theory of computing systems
Data de publicació
2016-07
Volum
59
Número
1
Pàgina inicial
1
Pàgina final
23
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-015-9634-4 Obrir en finestra nova
Repositori
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/101923 Obrir en finestra nova
URL
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00224-015-9634-4 Obrir en finestra nova
Resum
The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used typically to model sponsored search auctions does not include the notion of budget constraints, which is present in practice. Motivated by this, we introduce the different variants of GSP auctions that take budgets into account in natural ways. We examine their stability by focusing on the existence of Nash equilibria and envy-free assignments. We highlight the differences between these mechanisms and find that only some of them exhibit both notion...
Paraules clau
Auctions, Second Price, Sponsored Search, Keyword Auctions
Grup de recerca
ALBCOM - Algorismia, Bioinformàtica, Complexitat i Mètodes Formals

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