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Preorders in simple games

Autor
Freixas, J.; Pons, M.
Tipus d'activitat
Article en revista
Revista
Transactions on computational collective intelligence
Data de publicació
2017
Volum
10480
Pàgina inicial
63
Pàgina final
73
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70647-4_5 Obrir en finestra nova
Projecte finançador
Aspectos matemáticos, computacionales y sociales en contextos de votación y de cooperación
URL
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-70647-4_5 Obrir en finestra nova
Resum
Any power index defines a total preorder in a simple game and, thus, induces a hierarchy among its players. The desirability relation, which is also a preorder, induces the same hierarchy as the Banzhaf and the Shapley indices on linear games, i.e., games in which the desirability relation is total. The desirability relation is a sub--preorder of another preorder, the weak desirability relation, and the class of weakly linear games, i.e., games for which the weak desirability relation is total, ...
Paraules clau
Desirability, Linear game, Power index, Preorder, Simple game, Weak desirability, Weakly linear game
Grup de recerca
GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs

Participants