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A new power index based on minimal winning coalitions without any surplus

Autor
Alonso, J.; Freixas, J.
Tipus d'activitat
Article en revista
Revista
Decision support systems
Data de publicació
2010-04
Volum
49
Número
1
Pàgina inicial
70
Pàgina final
76
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2010.01.003 Obrir en finestra nova
Repositori
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/7622 Obrir en finestra nova
Resum
In this paper we propose a new power index useful for the evaluation of each member in a committee, or democratic institution, and the degree of influence over the voting decision making system. The proposed solution is based on the observation that democratic organizations not only tend to form coalitions which can by themselves guarantee the control of the organization, but that they also do it in an extremely efficient way that avoids the inclusion of powerful members if they can be replaced ...
Citació
Alonso Meijide, J.M.; Freixas, J. A new power index based on minimal winning coalitions without any surplus. "Decision support systems", Abril 2010, vol. 49, núm. 1, p. 70-76.
Grup de recerca
GRTJ - Grup de Recerca en Teoria de Jocs

Participants