Brands are one of the most important of a firm's assets. Brand-managing activities are typically related to brand positioning and integration with marketing campaigns, and can involve complex decisions. The branding of an organization is indeed a dynamic system with many cause-effect relationships as well as intangible and heterogeneous variables. In order to help brand managers and marketers, we propose a decision support system, named Identimod, for modeling and evaluating branding strategies. Identimod uses non-linear dynamic modeling and soft computing to identify the branding system from different data sources through a linguistic user interface, and to provide advanced methods for diagnostics and validation. Identimod steps through a participatory, cyclic, and iterative process consisting of four different modules to increase the confidence and validity of the model, which should facilitate its acceptance by managers and stakeholders. Throughout this paper we demonstrate the modeling process and managerial benefits of Identimod by forming and answering the marketing questions for a real rebranding case of a seafood company in Spain
Weighted games for several levels of approval in input and output were introduced in . An extension of the desirability relation for simple games, called the influence relation, was introduced for games with several levels of approval in input in  (see also ). However, there are weighted games not being complete for the influence relation, something different to what occurs for simple games. In this paper we introduce several extensions of the desirability relation for simple games and from the completeness of them it follows the consistent link with weighted games, which solves the existing gap. Moreover, we prove that the influence relation is consistent with a known subclass of weighted games: strongly weighted games. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Binary voting systems, usually represented by simple games, constitute a main DSS topic. A crucial feature of
such a system is the easiness with which a proposal can be collectively accepted, which is measured by the
“decisiveness index” of the corresponding game. We study here several functions related to the decisiveness
of any simple game. The analysis, including the asymptotic behavior as the number n of players increases, is
restricted to decisive symmetric games and their compositions, and it is assumed that all players have a
common probability p to vote for the proposal. We show that, for n large enough, a small variation, either
positive or negative, in p when p=1/2 takes the decisiveness to quickly approach, respectively, 1 or 0.
Moreover, we analyze the speed of the decisiveness convergence.
In this paper we propose a new power index useful for the evaluation of each member in a committee, or democratic institution, and the degree of influence over the voting decision making system. The proposed solution is based on the observation that democratic organizations not only tend to form coalitions which can by themselves guarantee the control of the organization, but that they also do it in an extremely efficient way that avoids the inclusion of powerful members if they can be replaced by weaker ones. The mathematical foundation of the new measure is based on two different axiomatizations. A comparison with other well-known measures is also done.