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The minimum sum representation as an index of voting power

Author
Freixas, J.; Kaniovski, S.
Type of activity
Journal article
Journal
European journal of operational research
Date of publication
2014-03-16
Volume
233
Number
3
First page
739
Last page
748
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.09.010 Open in new window
Repository
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/21411 Open in new window
URL
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221713007467 Open in new window
Abstract
We propose a new power index based on the minimum sum representation (MSR) of a weighted voting game. The MSR o ers a redesign of a voting game, such that voting power as measured by the MSR index becomes proportional to voting weight. The MSR index is a coherent measure of power that is ordinally equivalent to the Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik and Johnston indices. We provide a characterization for a bicameral meet as a weighted game or a complete game, and show that the MSR index is immune to the bi...
Citation
Freixas, J.; Kaniovski, S. The minimum sum representation as an index of voting power. "European journal of operational research", 16 Març 2014, vol. 233, núm. 3, p. 739-748.
Keywords
Bicameral meet, Minimum integer sum representation, Power indices, Proportional design between shares and power, Rankings
Group of research
GRTJ - Game Theory Research Group

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