Loading...
Loading...

Go to the content (press return)

The minimum sum representation as an index of voting power

Author
Freixas, J.; Kaniovski, S.
Type of activity
Presentation of work at congresses
Name of edition
European Public Choice Society Meeting 2014
Date of publication
2014
Presentation's date
2014-04-04
Book of congress proceedings
The European Public Choice Society Meeting 2014
First page
1
Last page
22
URL
http://131.111.165.101/epcs2014/openconf/modules/request.php?module=oc_program&action=view.php&id=52 Open in new window
Abstract
We propose a new power index based on the minimum sum representation (MSR) of a weighted voting game. The MSR offers a redesign of a voting game, such that voting power as measured by the MSR index becomes proportional to voting weight. The MSR index is a coherent measure of power that is ordinally equivalent to the Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik and Johnston indices. We provide a characterization for a bicameral meet as a weighted game or a complete game, and show that the MSR index is immune to the b...
Keywords
Bicameral meet, Minimum integer sum representation, Power indices, Proportional design between shares and power, Rankings
Group of research
GRTJ - Game Theory Research Group

Participants