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On the stability of generalized second price auctions with budgets

Author
Diaz, J.; Giotis, I.; Kirousis, L.; Markakis, E.; Serna, M.
Type of activity
Journal article
Journal
Theory of computing systems
Date of publication
2016-07
Volume
59
Number
1
First page
1
Last page
23
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-015-9634-4 Open in new window
Repository
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/101923 Open in new window
URL
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00224-015-9634-4 Open in new window
Abstract
The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used typically to model sponsored search auctions does not include the notion of budget constraints, which is present in practice. Motivated by this, we introduce the different variants of GSP auctions that take budgets into account in natural ways. We examine their stability by focusing on the existence of Nash equilibria and envy-free assignments. We highlight the differences between these mechanisms and find that only some of them exhibit both notion...
Citation
Diaz, J., Giotis, I., Kirousis, L., Markakis, E., Serna, M. On the stability of generalized second price auctions with budgets. "Theory of computing systems", Juliol 2016, vol. 59, núm. 1, p. 1-23.
Keywords
Auctions, Keyword auctions, Second price, Sponsored search
Group of research
ALBCOM - Algorithms, Computational Biology, Complexity and Formal Methods

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