Loading...
Loading...

Go to the content (press return)

Pure bargaining problems with a coalition structure

Author
Carreras, F.; Owen, G.
Type of activity
Journal article
Journal
Homo oeconomicus
Date of publication
2016-08
Volume
33
Number
1-2
First page
93
Last page
120
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-016-0007-2 Open in new window
Project funding
Game theory: mathematical foundations and applications
Repository
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/89737 Open in new window
Abstract
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s41412-016-0007-2 We consider here pure bargaining problems endowed with a coalition structure such that each union is given its own utility. In this context we use the Shapley rule in order to assess the main options available to the agents: individual behavior, cooperative behavior, isolated unions behavior, and bargaining unions behavior. The latter two respectively recall the treatment given by Aumann–Drèze and O...
Citation
Carreras, F., Owen, G. Pure bargaining problems with a coalition structure. "Homo oeconomicus", Agost 2016, vol. 33, núm. 1-2, p. 93-120.
Keywords
Shapley rule, Coalition structure, Pure bargaining problem
Group of research
GRTJ - Game Theory Research Group

Participants

Attachments