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Dimension, egalitarianism and decisiveness of European voting systems

Author
Carreras, F.; Freixas, J.; Magaña, A.
Type of activity
Journal article
Journal
Operations Research and Decisions
Date of publication
2016-01-01
Volume
26
Number
2
First page
31
Last page
52
DOI
10.5277/ord160203
Project funding
Mathematical, computational and social aspects in voting and cooperation contexts
Repository
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/91241 Open in new window
Abstract
An analysis of three major aspects has been carried out that may apply to any of the successive voting systems used for the European Union Council of Ministers, from the first one established in the Treaty of Rome in 1958 to the current one established in Lisbon. We mainly consider the voting systems designed for the enlarged European Union adopted in the Athens summit, held in April 2003 but this analysis can be applied to any other system. First, it is shown that the dimension of these voting ...
Citation
Carreras, F., Freixas, J., Magaña, A. Dimension, egalitarianism and decisiveness of European voting systems. "Operations Research and Decisions", 2016, vol. 26, núm. 2, p. 31-52.
Keywords
Decisiveness, Dimension, Egalitarianism, Shapley–Shubik power index, Simple games, Voting systems, Weighted majority games
Group of research
GRTJ - Game Theory Research Group

Participants

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