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Ability to separate situations with a priori coalition structures by means of symmetric solutions

Author
Gimenez, J.
Type of activity
Presentation of work at congresses
Name of edition
6th International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems
Date of publication
2017
Presentation's date
2017-02-24
Book of congress proceedings
ICORES 2017: proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems: Porto, Portugal, February 23-25, 2017
First page
242
Last page
249
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5220/0006116802420249 Open in new window
Project funding
Mathematical, computational and social aspects in voting and cooperation contexts
Repository
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/102517 Open in new window
Abstract
We say that two situations described by cooperative games are inseparable by a family of solutions, when they obtain the same allocation by all solution concept of this family. The situation of separability by a family of linear solutions reduces to separability from the null game. This is the case of the family of solutions based on marginal contributions weighted by coef¿cients only dependent of the coalition size: the semivalues. It is known that for games with four or more players, the spac...
Citation
Gimenez, J. Ability to separate situations with a priori coalition structures by means of symmetric solutions. A: International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems. "ICORES 2017: proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems: Porto, Portugal, February 23-25, 2017". Porto: 2017, p. 242-249.
Keywords
Coalition structure, Cooperative game, Marginal contribution, Semivalue, Separability
Group of research
GRTJ - Game Theory Research Group

Participants