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Non-centralized control for flow-based distribution networks: a game-theoretical insight

Author
Barreiro, J.; Ocampo-Martinez, C.A.; Quijano, N.; Maestre, J.
Type of activity
Journal article
Journal
Journal of the Franklin Institute
Date of publication
2017-09-01
Volume
354
Number
14
First page
5571
Last page
5796
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfranklin.2017.06.021 Open in new window
Repository
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/109821 Open in new window
URL
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016003217303149?via%3Dihub Open in new window
Abstract
This paper solves a data-driven control problem for a flow-based distribution network with two objectives: a resource allocation and a fair distribution of costs. These objectives represent both cooperation and competition directions. It is proposed a solution that combines either a centralized or distributed cooperative game approach using the Shapley value to determine a proper partitioning of the system and a fair communication cost distribution. On the other hand, a decentralized non-coopera...
Citation
Barreiro, J., Ocampo-Martinez, C.A., Quijano, N., Maestre, J. Non-centralized control for flow-based distribution networks: a game-theoretical insight. "Journal of the Franklin Institute", 1 Setembre 2017, vol. 354, núm. 14, p. 5571-5796.
Keywords
Flow-based distribution networks, Nash equilibrium, Shapley value, cooperative games, distributed control, dynamic resource allocation, partitioning approach, population games
Group of research
CS2AC-UPC - Supervision, Safety and Automatic Control
SAC - Advanced Control Systems

Participants

  • Barreiro Gomez, Julian  (author)
  • Ocampo Martinez, Carlos A.  (author)
  • Quijano Silva, Nicanor  (author)
  • Maestre Torreblanca, José María  (author)