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A new coalitional value

Author
Carreras, F.; Alonso, J.
Type of activity
Report
Date
2009-10
Project funding
Juegos cooperativos y conflictos de intereses. Teoría y práctica
URL
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/4037 Open in new window
Abstract
We propose a modification of the Shapley value for monotonic games with a coalition structure. The resulting coalitional value is a twofold extension of the Shapley value in the following sense: (1) the amount obtained by any union coincides with the Shapley value of the union in the quotient game; and (2) the players of the union share this amount proportionally to their Shapley value in the original game (i.e., without unions). We provide axiomatic characterizations of this value close to thos...
Group of research
GRTJ - Game Theory Research Group

Participants