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The social cost of congestion games by imposing variable delays

Author
Diaz, J.; Giotis, I.; Kirousis, L.; Mourtos, I.; Serna, M.
Type of activity
Journal article
Journal
ICT Express
Date of publication
2017-12-01
Volume
3
Number
4
First page
155
Last page
159
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.icte.2017.11.014 Open in new window
Project funding
Algorísmia, Bioinformàtica, Complexitat i Mètodes Formals ALBCOM
Computational Models and Methods for Massive Structured Data
Repository
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/114795 Open in new window
URL
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405959517301960?via%3Dihub#! Open in new window
Abstract
In this study, we describe a new coordination mechanism for non-atomic congestion games that leads to a (selfish) social cost which is arbitrarily close to the non-selfish optimal. This mechanism incurs no additional cost, in contrast to tolls that typically differ from the social cost as expressed in terms of delays. © . This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Citation
Diaz, J., Giotis, I., Kirousis, L., Mourtos, I., Serna, M. The social cost of congestion games by imposing variable delays. "ICT Express", 1 Desembre 2017, vol. 3, núm. 4, p. 155-159.
Keywords
Congestion games, Coordination mechanisms, Price of anarchy
Group of research
ALBCOM - Algorithms, Computational Biology, Complexity and Formal Methods

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