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Coalition formation and stability

Author
Magaña, A.; Carreras, F.
Type of activity
Journal article
Journal
Group decision and negotiation
Date of publication
2018-06
Volume
27
Number
3
First page
467
Last page
502
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9570-1 Open in new window
Project funding
Mathematical, computational and social aspects in voting and cooperation contexts
Repository
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/118049 Open in new window
URL
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10726-018-9570-1 Open in new window
Abstract
This paper aims to develop, for any cooperative game, a solution notion that enjoys stability and consists of a coalition structure and an associated payoff vector derived from the Shapley value. To this end, two concepts are combined: those of strong Nash equilibrium and Aumann--Dr\`{e}ze coalitional value. In particular, we are interested in conditions ensuring that the grand coalition is the best preference for all players. Monotonicity, convexity, cohesiveness and other conditions are used t...
Citation
Magaña, A., Carreras, F. Coalition formation and stability. "Group decision and negotiation", Juny 2018, vol. 27, núm. 3, p. 467-502.
Keywords
Aumann--Dr\`{e}ze value, Coalition structure, Cohesiveness, Convexity, Game theory, Monotonicity, Shapley value, Stability, Strong Nash equilibrium, Superadditivity, TU cooperative game
Group of research
GRTJ - Game Theory Research Group

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