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An axiomatic characterization of simple majority rule and extension to broader contexts

Author
Freixas, J.; Pons, M.
Type of activity
Presentation of work at congresses
Name of edition
14th Spain-Italy-Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory
Date of publication
2018
Presentation's date
2018-07-16
Book of congress proceedings
SING14: Bayreuth 16th-18th, 2018: 14th Spain-Italy-Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory, University of Bayreuth: book of abstracts
First page
23
Last page
23
Abstract
Simple majority is a very common rule to make collective decisions in a voting context. Following this rule, each individual can either be in favor of the proposal (represented by input 1), be indifferent to it (input 0), or be against it (input -1). The proposal is approved (output 1) if the number of votes in favor of it is greater than the number of votes against it, it is rejected (output -1) in the opposite case, and there may be a tie (output 0) if the number of votes for both sides coinci...
Keywords
Independence of Properties, Properties, Simple majority rule, Uniqueness, Voting rules
Group of research
GRTJ - Game Theory Research Group

Participants