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Satisfaction and power in unanimous majority influence decision models

Author
Molinero, X.; Riquelme, F.; Serna, M.
Type of activity
Journal article
Journal
Electronic notes in discrete mathematics
Date of publication
2018-07
Volume
68
First page
197
Last page
202
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.endm.2018.06.034 Open in new window
Project funding
ALBCOM - Algorismia, Bioinformàtica, Complexitat i Mètodes Formal
Barcelona Graduate School of Mathematics
Graph-based Models and Methods for Computing in the Large
Mathematical, computational and social aspects in voting and cooperation contexts
Repository
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/122635 Open in new window
URL
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1571065318301252 Open in new window
Abstract
We consider decision models associated with cooperative influence games, the oblivious and the non-oblivious influence models. In those models the satisfaction and the power measures were introduced and studied. We analyze the computational complexity of those measures when the in uence level is set to unanimity and the rule of decision is simple majority. We show that computing the satisfaction and the power measure in those systems are #P-hard.
Citation
Molinero, X., Riquelme, F., Serna, M. Satisfaction and power in unanimous majority influence decision models. "Electronic notes in discrete mathematics", Juliol 2018, vol. 68, p. 197-202.
Keywords
Banzhaf value, Decision model, Influence game, Power, Satisfaction
Group of research
ALBCOM - Algorithms, Computational Biology, Complexity and Formal Methods
GRTJ - Game Theory Research Group

Participants