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A parameterization for a class of complete games with abstention

Author
Freixas, J.; Tchantcho, B.; Proces, B.
Type of activity
Journal article
Journal
Discrete applied mathematics
Date of publication
2019-02-28
Volume
255
First page
21
Last page
39
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2018.07.032 Open in new window
Project funding
Mathematical, computational and social aspects in voting and cooperation contexts
Repository
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/124189 Open in new window
URL
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166218X18304396 Open in new window
Abstract
Voting games with abstention are voting systems in which players can cast not only yes and no vote, but are allowed to abstain. This paper centers on the structure of a class of complete games with abstention. We obtain, a parameterization that can be useful for enumerating these games, up to isomorphism. Indeed, any I-complete game is determined by a vector of matrices with non-negative integers entries. It also allows us determining whether a complete game with abstention is a strongly weighte...
Citation
Freixas, J., Tchantcho, B., Proces, B. A parameterization for a class of complete games with abstention. "Discrete applied mathematics", 28 February 2019, vol. 255, p. 21-39.
Keywords
(3, 2) games, Abstention, Desirability relations, Weighted games and complete games
Group of research
GRTJ - Game Theory Research Group

Participants