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Games with Multiple Alternatives Applied to Voting Systems

Author
Blasco, J.; Molinero, X.
Type of activity
Book chapter
Book
Decision Economics: Complexity of Decisions and Decisions for Complexity
First page
117
Last page
124
Publisher
Springer
Date of publication
2020-02
ISBN
978-3-030-38226-1 Open in new window
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-38227-8
Repository
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/177708 Open in new window
URL
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783030382261 Open in new window
Abstract
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems as well as electoral systems and parliamentary organizations. These mechanisms are base on the so-called power indices of simple games with alternatives. The classical power indices applied to simple games just consider two options, yes/agree or not/reject. Here we also consider the abstention option, whose condition is allowed in most voting rules. In fact, we consider the extended Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf indices to measure the power of...
Citation
Blasco, J.; Molinero, X. Games with multiple alternatives applied to voting systems. A: "Decision economics: complexity of decisions and decisions for complexity". Berlín: Springer, 2020, p. 117-124.
Keywords
Power indices with mutiple alternative, Simple games, Voting systems
Group of research
GRTJ - Game Theory Research Group

Participants