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Coalitional power indices applied to voting systems

Author
Molinero, X.; Blasco, J.
Type of activity
Presentation of work at congresses
Name of edition
9th International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems
Date of publication
2020
Presentation's date
2020-02-23
Book of congress proceedings
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems
First page
372
Last page
376
DOI
10.5220/0009166803720376
Repository
http://hdl.handle.net/2117/179936 Open in new window
URL
https://www.scitepress.org/HomePage.aspx Open in new window
Abstract
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems. The classical power indices applied to simple games just consider parties, players or voters. Here, we also consider games with a priori unions, i.e., coalitions among parties, players or voters. We measure the power of each party, player or voter when there are coalitions among them. In particular, we study real situations of voting systems using extended Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf indices, the so-called coalitional power indices. We also...
Citation
Molinero, X.; Blasco, J. Coalitional power indices applied to voting systems. A: International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems. "Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Operations Research and Enterprise Systems". 2020, p. 372-376.
Keywords
Coalitional Power Indices, Simple Games, Voting Systems
Group of research
GRTJ - Game Theory Research Group

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