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Assortative multisided assignment games: the extreme core points

Author
Martínez, J.; Rafels, C.; Ybern, M.
Type of activity
Journal article
Journal
Games and economic behavior
Date of publication
2020-03-01
Volume
120
First page
144
Last page
153
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.001
URL
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0899825620300026?via%3Dihub Open in new window
Abstract
We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martínez-de-Albéniz et al. (2019). In them players' abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of extreme core point...
Keywords
Assignment game, Assortative market, Core, Extreme core allocations, Multisided assignment game

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